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Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught:
Can We Improve Lawyer Professionalism
by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?
BY W. WILLIAM HODES*
I. A STRANGE NEW THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS-
EvEN PLAYING BY THE RULES IS UNETHICAL
did not realize it at the time, but in retrospect, I must have sensed
in October 1993 that we were in for a particularly disturbing bout
of lawyer-bashing. Even before O.J. Simpson killed two people in
Los Angeles and jumped on the redeye to Chicago, I must have sensed that
it was going to be particularly disturbing, because this lawyer-bashing was
going to be unleashed-or at least tolerated-by the elite stratum of the
profession. Things only got worse after the "Trial of the Century," of
course, because the unpopular and unjust' result in that case gave the elite
*Professor of Law, IndianaUniversity School of Law-Indianapolis. B.A. 1966,
Harvard College; J.D. 1969, Rutgers University.
' I am on record as approving of the ethics and professionalism of the "Dream
Team" defense lawyers in the O.J. Simpson case. See W. William Hodes, Lord
Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification ofthe Third Kind, 67 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1075 (1996). At the same time, it is not inconsistent to believe-as I
and most Americans do-that the result the lawyers achieved was unjust. See id. at
1077.
Even Alan Dershowitz, a member of the "Dream Team," thinks it plausible to
see the result of the trial as either just or unjust, depending on how long- or short-
term the view. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J.
SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (1996) ("I will try to
explain why even jurors who thought that Simpson 'did it' as a matter of fact could
reasonably have found him not guilty as a matter of law-and of justice.").
Elsewhere in his book, Professor Dershowitz discusses what he refers to as a
different "genre of jury nullification," see id. at 93-98, which is virtually
indistinguishable from what I was calling "jury nullification of the third kind."
Hodes, supra, at 1075.
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bar further license to distance itself from what it saw as the not al-
together savory trial and criminal defense bars.2 Distance was going to be
especially desirable because these criminal defense lawyers not only toiled
on behalf of a particularly odious client, but they had also had the bad taste
to win.
But that was later. In October 1993, the Professional Responsibility
Section of the Association of American Law Schools was holding a
weekend teaching conference in Washington, D.C., focusing on the
teaching of legal ethics in general and on adversarial zealousness in
particular. The featured luncheon speaker was Stanley Sporkin, United
States District Judge for the District of Columbia,3 justly famous in the
world of legal ethics for surveying the wreckage of yet another looted
savings and loan institution and lamenting, "Where were the lawyers?"4
With this battle cry, Judge Sporkin, who had earlierrisen from enforcement
attorney to General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
made an essential point about legal ethics. When a transaction lawyer
representing a client committing fraud crosses over the line into knowing
2 See infra Part II. The elite bar could never put its finger on exactly what the
"Dream Team" did that was wrong or what it should have done instead of what it
did do. Instead, the elite bar joined the popular chorus in insisting that something
must be wrong with the justice system if an obviously guilty defendant can be
acquitted of two brutal murders. Moreover, there must have been something
unethical and unprofessional about lawyers who would manipulate the system to
take advantage of its evident weaknesses. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying
text, demonstrating that even a former defense attorney, now a well-respected law
professor, could not break out of this mold.
3 See Audiotape of Stanley Sporkin, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught Is
There an Inconsistency in Attempting to Teach Ethics Where the Substantive
Subjects Presuppose an Adversarial System? (Oct. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
' This is the commonly accepted paraphrase of Judge Sporkin's lament What
he actually wrote was: "Where were these professionals [lawyers and accountants],
a number ofwhom are now asserting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when
these clearly improper transactions were being consummated? Why didn't any of
them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions?" Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); cf Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Layers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers'
Responsibilityfor Clients 'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993). Langevoort asserts
that lawyer complicity may be attributable in part to the irreconcilable tension
between client loyalty and the requirement to obey law. More plausibly, it may be
attributable to ego, stress, and over-identification with the client interfering with
the lawyer's cognition of the realities of the situation until it is too late for easy
extrication. See id. at 95-111.
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participation or facilitation,' the lawyer loses the immunity from liability
and just censure that ordinarily accompanies the professional role.6
s See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1998). In order
to be unethical, actionable or criminal, a lawyer's participation in a client's frauds
must be "knowing" or "willful" or occur with some other high level ofscienter. See
id. The line between legitimate representation and illicit participation also invokes
the most difficult epistemological question of legal ethics: "What does a lawyer
know?" For example, see United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964),
a stock fraud case from an earlier era. With respect to the element of willfulness,
Judge Henry Friendly wrote:
[T]he Government can meet its burden by proving that a defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see.., or recklessly
stated as facts things of which he was ignorant.... In our complex society
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of
course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of
fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply
because more skillful practitioners would not have made them. But
Congress equally could not have intended that men holding themselves out
as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape criminal
liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was
plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge they knew they did not
possess.
Id. at 862-63 (citations omitted).
6 See generally Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability
ofLawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978). The literature on what moral philosophers
call "role differentiation" is vast and cannot be recounted here in any detail. In
brief, the traditional argument is that when lawyers are "on duty," they are required
by their professional role to maximize client interests through all legally available
means even if in their private capacities they would oppose what the client seeks.
Since lawyers are professionally required to take aggressive action on behalf of
clients, it is by definition not unethical or "unprofessional" for them to do so.
Moreover, it is not morally wrong either, since lawyers are only doing their jobs
or playing the role that the system has assigned to them.
The most extreme critics of role differentiated behavior by lawyers attack the
legitimacy of lawyering itself. A more responsible argument is that since any
particular lawyer is not required to accept any particular client's cause, lawyers can
be subject to moral censure for the choices they do make. Significantly, this
concession has been made by one of the strongest and most vocal supporters of the
adversary system. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 65-71 (1990).
Once the decision has been made to represent a client in a particular matter,
however, the lawyer may notpullpunches or choose half-hearted measures because
1998-99] 1021
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Zealousness within the bounds of the law?7 Not bloody likely, the former
of lingering disagreement with the client's aims. That would be unethical, for the
client would be stuck with-and often be paying for-a non-zealous lawyer who was
not willing to loyally serve the client's interests as defined by the client. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a).
As will be seen throughout this Article, there is a further and critical distinction
between transaction lawyers and litigation lawyers that implicates how we ought
to view their respective roles. Transaction lawyers are typically involved at the
earliest stages of a client's project and have multiple opportunities to help shape its
course, for good or for ill. When a client's project turns out to be a fraudulent one,
it is therefore natural for onlookers at least to suspect that the lawyers were
implicated in the wrongdoing. Litigation lawyers, by contrast, typically arrive on
the scene after the basic story has played itself out and the basic facts are set. A
crime has been committed, a contract has been breached, a dangerous product has
caused harm. It is rarely plausible, therefore, to imagine that these lawyers are
complicit in any wrongdoing, save cases of new wrongs committed during the
litigation, such as perjury or destruction of evidence. To put it simply, although
O.J. Simpson's defense lawyers were attacked mercilessly in the press and in
society generally, no one ever accused them of killing anyone.
7 The title of this Kentucky Law Journal symposium issue was taken from the
"axiomatic norm" of Canon 7 of the old Model Code: A Lawyer ShouldRepresent
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrrY Canon 7 (1980). Agreeably to some and to the
chagrin of others, see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, promulgated in 1983 by the American Bar Association
to replace the Model Code, do not contain a mandatory reference to zealousness.
See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3. But see id. Rule 1.3 cmt.
This comment reads: "A lawyer... may take whatever lawful and ethical measures
are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf." Id. Without explanation-and without apparent
justification-the next sentence of the same comment continues as follows:
"However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be
realized for a client." Id.
With respect to the other half of the old formula, which set limits on
partisanship, the Model Rules are sharper.
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conductwith a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
Id. Rule 1.2(d). There are still significant problems of interpretation and
application, of course. Beyond the problem of scienter, see supra note 5, the last
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regulator was correctly saying; not unless the law of accessorial liability is
somehow made to disappear.'
In his luncheon address, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Is There
an Inconsistency in Attempting to Teach Ethics Where the Substantive
Subjects Presuppose an Adversarial System?,9 Judge Sporkin was hunting
different game. Still in thrall of his important and sound insight that
lawyers should be held accountable for giving illicit aid and comfort to
wrongdoing clients but oblivious to the different roles that lawyers play in
part.of Rule 1.2(d) requires distinguishing between good faith test case litigation,
classic civil disobedience by appealing to higher law, and surreptitious civil
disobedience, which is no different than law-breaking.
I In all discussions of "the bounds of law," as used in the Model Code and
elsewhere, there is a legitimate anterior question of what should count as "law"
without resorting to tautology. This was referred to as "the boundary claim" in
DavidB. Wilkins, LegalRealism forLawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,471 (1990).
The boundary claim and whether a proposition should count as "law" merely
because embodied in a traditional legal format, such as a statute or a court order,
were debated elegantly and brilliantly in a trio of papers presented at a Forum on
the Teaching of Legal Ethics, sponsored by the W. M. Keck Foundation at the
William and Mary School of Law in March 1996. See William H. Simon, Should
Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1996); David Luban,
Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 255 (1996); David B. Willdns, In Defense ofLaw andMorality: WhyLawyers
Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269
(1996).
I agree with Professor Simon that what he calls "Narrow Positivism," namely
that the mere pedigree of a rule should end all debate about where the bounds of
law lie, is unsound. See Simon, supra, at 220-27. But I also agree with Pro-
fessors Luban and Wilkins that in practice, most lawyers appropriately adopt a
more nuanced "Wide Positivism" that permits moral and political ideas to
inform the "true" content of law. See Luban, supra, at 258-59; Wilkins, supra, at
278-79. In the end, I agree most with Professor Wilkins's bottom line position that
because oftheir role in operating the system ofjustice, lawyers should have to meet
a higher rather than a lower burden to justify civil disobedience. See id. at 289-93.
The mere fact that someone is a lawyer, in other words, changes the calculus on
how that person ought to respond to challenging legal-moral dilemmas. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13-16
(1989).
All three authors in the William & Mary Keck Foundation Forum agreed, of
course, that in many situations, perhaps most, all routes lead to the easy conclusion
that a certain proposition is law (and that it ought to be obeyed).
' Sporkin, supra note 3.
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different legal settings, 0 he applied the same analysis and reached the same
conclusion with respect to lawyers whose only aid and comfort to clients
came in the form of representation in already ongoing litigation. Under the
guise of raising questions about where the outer limits of zealousness in
litigation might lie, he launched an all-out attack on the very heartland of
zealous advocacy.'
Judge Sporkin did not directly answer his own rhetorical question
about the possible inconsistency between legal ethics and the adversary
system. Instead, he told a series of what he evidently thought were horror
stories about "unethical" lawyers or lawyers practicing "minimalist"
ethics. 2 Put these stories together, however, and the conclusion he was
trying to draw was inescapable. Aggressive action taken within the current
boundaries of the adversary system is often "unethical" action, and the law
schools are thus doomed to the inconsistency suggested in Judge Sporkin's
title. Given that an adversarial system has no use for ethics, he told the
nation's teachers of legal ethics, you should either give up teaching this
useless knowledge, or you should improve your teaching of legal ethics by
taking a leading role in efforts to abolish the adversary system, or at least
radically curtail it.
13
Listening again to the audiotape of the 1993 event, which was about
half prepared speech and half question-and-answer session, I was again
struck by the breadth of Judge Sporkin's attack. This was equal opportunity
lawyer bashing. Lawyers for manufacturers of a "killer product" were
unethical when they resisted production of damaging documents in
discovery, even though they had a concededly nonfrivolous objection that
they litigated in the open. 4 It was unethical for government lawyers to
'0 See supra note 6.
" See Sporkin, supra note 3.
121d.
13 See id. Some academics are indeed at the forefront of efforts to erode
seriously the adversary system. See infra Part Hm.
" See Sporkin, supra note 3. The documents in question had been provided to
a government agency under a special secrecy agreement. When the plaintiffs in the
case sought discovery, both the manufacturers and the government agency argued
strenuously that production in this private litigation would not be in the public
interest because it would make it more difficult for the agency to secure like
documents in the future.
Judge Sporkin ordered production, and I am not here quarreling with that
decision. But I am dismayed (and said so at the time) that a federal judge-by
definition an elite member of the profession-would think it "unethical" for the
company's lawyers even to litigate the question.
1024 [VOL. 87
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argue in favor of a harsh jail sentence for a middle-aged woman, a street
person who was convicted for a second time of selling drugs, even though
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines5 called for that sentence, and even
though Judge Sporkin as the sentencingjudge had little discretion to depart
from it.
16
Judge Sporkin reserved his greatest scorn for criminal defense lawyers
who go beyond procedural and constitutional deficiencies in the prosecu-
tion's case and argue for acquittal on the merits, even when they know the
defendant is factually guilty. 7 In his rulebook, it is permissible to vindicate
the values of the Fourth Amendment by moving to suppress the only
evidence against a guilty drug dealer, but it is unconscionable to take
seriously the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of ajury trial by trying to coax
the jury into factual error. 8 In both cases a factually guilty defendant
"walks," but only in the latter are the defendant's lawyers insolently
"wrapping themselves in the flag of the Constitution."' 9
In those pre-O.J. days of late 1993, the best stories from the trenches
were about the trials growing out of the assault on Reginald Denny,20 which
'5 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
'6See Sporkin, supra note 3. It should not go unnoticed that, in this and several
other examples Judge Sporkin discussed, he could not enforce his view of what
legal ethics requires because his view was not supported by the "law" of lawyering.
Whatever one thinks of the "boundary claim" of deciding what is outside the
bounds of law, and thus at least presumptively off-limits for lawyers, see supra
note 8, it is clear that what Judge Sporkin says at a luncheon address is not law.
What he says in a judicial opinion is law, but that law can be overruled on appeal
and new law substituted in its place. In nonconstitutional settings, the law can be
further modified by an "appeal" to political actors, including members of the
public.
" I do not disagree with Judge Sporkin that criminal defense lawyers frequently
have this knowledge. See Hodes, supra note 1, at 1098 n.59; see also id. at 1083-84
(quoting, among other sources, the "Rules of the Justice Game" set out in ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (Vintage Books 1983) (1982), which hold that
"almost all" criminal defendants are in fact guilty and that "all" criminal defense
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges are aware of this).
Where Judge Sporkin and I disagree, of course, is that I believe it would be
unethical for a criminal defense lawyer not to argue for acquittal on the merits-if
that seemed tactically wise-merely because the lawyer had this inconvenient
knowledge about factual guilt. See the discussion of the films Cape Fear and The
Devil's Advocate, infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
8 See Sporkin, supra note 3.
19 Id.
20During the April 1992 riot after the verdicts in the Rodney King case, Damian
Williams and Henry Watson pulled white truck driver Reginald Denny out of the
1998-991 1025
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took place during the riot that grew out of the acquittal of the police
officers who assaulted Rodney King.2' Where were the lawyers in the trials
ofDamian Williams andHenry Watson? As recounted with evident disgust
by Judge Sporkin, they were not missing in action, as in the Lincoln
Savings & Loann case, but all too busy actively throwing sand in the
wheels ofjustice.23
One defendant's lawyer had the nerve to suggest to the jury that
perhaps the man clearly shown on videotape smashing a rock down on the
victim's skull was not even the same man sitting at the defense table. The
other defendant's lawyer suggested that perhaps the tape really showed that
cab of his truck and assaulted him with bricks and other implements. The events
were captured on police and news videotapes and clearly showed Williams hurling
a brick at the head of Denny while he lay on the ground and then performing a
celebratory dance in the manner of a football player after scoring a touchdown.
Watson had at about the same time put his foot on Denny's neck, pinning him to
the ground. See Jim Newton & Henry Weinstein, 3 Suspects Seized in Beating of
TruckDriverDuringRiot, L.A. TIMES, May 13,1992, atAl. Williams and Watson
were charged with multiple counts of assault, mayhem, and attempted murder, but
the jury acquitted them both on most counts, convicting Williams only on four
misdemeanor assault charges and a felony mayhem charge and Watson only on a
single misdemeanor assault charge. See Edward J. Boyer & Jesse Katz, Jury
Convicts Denny Defendants on Reduced Charges, Acquits on Others, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1993, at Al; Edward J. Boyer & Jesse Katz, Attempted MurderAcquittal,
Deadlock Wind Up Denny Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al. Williams's
convictions were affirmed on appeal. See People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521
(Ct. App. 1996).
21 Ex-convict Rodney King was arrested by four officers of the Los Angles
Police Department after a high-speed automobile chase on March 3, 1991. The
officers, claiming that King was resisting arrest, subjected him to a savage beating
that was captured on videotape by a bystander. See The Rodney G. King Beating,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at A20. The officers were charged with assault, but a
state court jury acquitted them on April 29, 1992, immediately touching off one of
the most violent riots in American history. See Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler,
Rioters SetFires, Loot Stores, 4ReportedDead, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, atAl;
Greg Braxton & Jim Newton, Looting and Fires Ravage L.A.; 25 Dead, 572
Injured; 1,000 Blazes Reported, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al. Subsequently,
the four officers were tried in federal court on charges of violating Rodney King's
civil rights, and two of them were convicted on April 17, 1993. See United States
v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1993), afl'd inpart and vacated in part,
34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), j. affrd inpart and rev'd inpart, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
3 See Sporkin, supra note 3.
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his client was trying to protect the victim from further injury at the hands
of others.24
But where was the unethical or unprofessional lawyer behavior that
was Judge Sporkin's reason for telling the story in the first place? Even
assuming the lawyers in the Denny beating case knew that their clients were
both physically present and loaded to the gills with mens rea, which tactic
or argument was unethical, as opposed to possibly unwise? What exactly
should the lawyers have done-ethically speaking-to carry out their
constitutional duty to provide effective assistance of counsel?
When pressed on these points in the question and answer period, Judge
Sporkin initially could say only that ethical counsel should plead their
clients guilty when they know of their clients' factual guilt. This will not
wash, however, for lawyers can only recommend that their clients plead
guilty and have no right or power to force the issue if the clients reject the
prosecutors' last best offer for a plea bargain .2 A second response was that
24 See id. Judge Sporkin could have added the further point that the first lawyer
tried to spin the jury an alternative yam about how the same person (if he was one
of the defendants) did not mean to hurt the victim but had himself been victimized
by being caught up in the tumult of mob psychology. Most trial lawyers would, I
imagine, avoid arguing in the alternative in such extreme fashion on the tactical
ground that it is too risky. While it is true that convincing even one juror of the
mistaken identity would at least hang the jury, the risk is great that all jurors would
have less confidence in any aspect of the defendant's case.
I In my article on the use of jury nullification in the O.J. Simpson case, see
Hodes, supra note 1, I assumed throughout that everyone involved in the case,
including not only the lawyers on both sides but also the jurors, "knew" that the
defendant was factually guilty, meaning that they knew that no one other than the
defendant wielded a knife and stabbed the two victims to death. That made no
difference to my judgment that the defense lawyers acted properly, and I would
make the same judgment in the Reginald Denny case.
Unlike situations in which a lawyer might beparticipating in a client's crimes
or frauds, see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text, where the lawyer's scienter
is critical, lawyers may defend clients vigorously regardless of what they know
about the facts. Indeed, once they make the decision to provide a defense, they are
obligated to press ahead with the same vigor, whether or not they know.
26 See Sporkin, supra note 3. Model Rule 1.2(a) reads in pertinent part: "In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify." MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1998).
Several Ethical Considerations of the Model Code were to the same effect, see
MODELCODE OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSBILITY EC 7-7,7-8 (1980), and ofcourse
applicable constitutional law also requires informed decision making by the client
1998-99] 1027
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perhaps counsel should simply not agree to provide representation in such
cases. That is fine for any particular lawyer, but some lawyer-perhaps the
proverbial "last lawyer in town"-will and should come forward to defend.27
Ifnot, a lawyer will eventually be appointed to take each case in any event.
If those lawyers tried to mount a defense on the merits, how could they
escape Judge Sporkin's censure?
Pressed further, Judge Sporkin insisted later in the question and answer
session that if the case was to be tried, then counsel could of course engage
in "zealous" advocacy, butthat this couldnot include "obscuring the facts,"
where the lawyer knew the facts.28 His point was not merely that counsel
must prevent the client from testifying falsely that he had not even been
present or from presenting a faked alibi. Virtually everyone agrees that
those tactics are beyond the bounds of law.29 In Judge Sporkin's view,
counsel should also be prevented from arguing to the jury that his client
was not guilty because someone else was.30
in this area. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) ("It is beyond
dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary.").
As will be seen, see infra text accompanying note 51, in the film Cape Fear,
fictional lawyer Sam Bowden did plead his fictional client guilty, without the
client's informed consent, even though there was an available defense tactic that
could have obscured the facts of his client's guilt.
' See Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant
and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAwYER 214 (David Luban ed., 1983).
28 Sporkin, supra note 3.
29 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a)(4) and 3.3(b),
which not only prohibit a lawyer from knowingly presenting perjured testimony but
also require the lawyer to take "reasonable remedial measures" if the false evidence
is presented and the lawyer learns of it later. Id. Rule 3.3. This duty holds even if
the lawyer must disclose otherwise confidential client information. See id. A well-
known disienting view comes from Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966), who argues that presentation of a client's perjured
testimony is immoral and almost always foolish, but ultimately required of defense
counsel if the client cannot be dissuaded. Professor Freedman's views have not
prevailed on this point. Moreover, imposition of a duty to interdict client perjury
does not violate the Sixth Amendment. SeeNix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,164-76
(1986).
" See Sporkin, supra note 3. When the O.J. Simpson case later came onto the
scene, it is highly likely that Judge Sporkin would have agreed with me that
Simpson was factually guilty and that his lawyers knew it. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text. Presumably, therefore, he would have limited Simpson's
lawyers to a defense based on provocation or diminished capacity, or some other
1028 [VOL. 87
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In this Article, I argue that Judge Sporkin reached the wrong conclu-
sion about the mission and method of American law schools because he
was wrong about both ethics and the adversarial system. His view of ethics
was too stingy, his view of the adversary system too alarmist. My
conclusion is evident from my title, which is an unapologetic play on Judge
Sporkin's. We will improve our teaching of legal ethics and professional-
ism only if we recognize that underzealousness in litigation is today more
of a problem than lawyers who exceed the bounds of law. We must teach
our students to wear the label of "hired gun" proudly3 ' andto have the skill
and the courage to do their assigned jobs with professional 6lan.
I1. POPULAR AND PROFESSIONAL DISCONTENT WITH THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND WITH THE LAWYERS WHO OPERATE IT
One of the reasons that too many of today's young lawyers lack the
courage to fight unpopular fights is that they have witnessed a barrage of
attacks on adversarial zeal. These attacks are found in political debate32 and
defense that did not challenge the basic facts of the killings. It should be evident
that I do not agree that a defense so badly hobbled in its choice of tactics could
validly be described as "zealous."
3 See Ted Sehneyer, Some Sympathyfor the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 11,
22-25 (1991) (arguing that neither the client-centerednor the public-regardingview
of legal ethics is always preferable in all circumstances, but that the "hired gun"
model is most justifiable in the criminal defense context). Professor Schneyer
agrees that underzealousness and disloyalty to clients is often more of a problem
in contemporary practice than is violation of the rules of conduct, even in the
criminal defense context. See id. at 23-24.
32 For reasons of space, I will not discuss in any detail the many contemporary
situations in which lawyer-bashing (and judge-bashing) have become standard
tactics employed in electoral campaigns. See, e.g., A Transcript of the First
Televised Debate Between Clinton and Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at B8.
In Stanley A. Goldman, First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the [Defense]
Lawyers, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1996), the author, writing the introduction to a
symposium of articles about attacks on criminal defense lawyers in particular,
noted that when Charles Manson prosecutor Vincent Bugliosi ran for Los Angeles
District Attorney against the incumbent John Van de Kamp, he attacked Van de
Kamp on the ground that, before Van de Kamp won office for the first time, he had
been a public defender. See id. at 2-3.
Sadly, inimy home state of Indiana, former Attorney General Pamela Carterran
the same kind of campaign ads against her opponent, an experienced public
defender and criminal defense attorney. She later defended the ads by saying that
they were legitimate efforts to inform the public of the contrasting experiences of
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the popular culture, and come from social critics as well as the elite leaders
of the profession. Too much of the organized bar's highly publicized effort
to improve "professionalism" and "civility" has uncritically adopted the
public's uninformed contempt for hard-nosed lawyering 3  In many
the two candidates. "'His has been to keep criminals out of prison, while the role
of the attorney general is to keep them in prison."' Kim L. Hooper, CarterDefends
TVAd; It's an Unfair Slam, Say Defense Lawyers, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 17,
1992, atB 1. The ads were also defended on similar grounds by Ann DeLaney, then
the Executive Director of the Indiana Democratic Party and also a lawyer. Ms.
DeLaney returned to this theme with comparable disingenuousness in her
disagreeable little book, Politics for Dummies. DeLaney states:
Criminal defense attorneys also have a difficult time getting elected to
office. Fairly or not, a defense attorney can be identified with the clients she
has represented in the past.... [While it is probably unfair to make this
association in elections generally], when you are choosing a prosecuting
attorney or another officeholder associated with the criminal justice system,
you may find the criminal defense attorney's background relevant
infotmation for you to consider.
ANN DELANEY, POLITICS FOR DUMMIES 152-53 (1995).
11 What has come to be known as the professionalism "movement" has
generated a massive outpouring of studies, reports, books and articles. The
movement has proceeded through countless barassociation meetings and academic
gatherings. The seminal document is A.B.A. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM ....
INTHE SPIRITOFPUBLIC SERVICE:"ABLUEPRINT FORTHEREKINDLING OFLAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [hereinafter "..... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE].
This document, commonly referred to as the Stanley Commission Report, was
subsequently published at 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986). The reference in the title to "the
spirit of public service" is borrowed from the leading contribution to the idea of
"professionalism" of an earlier era. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). Pound states:
The term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the
spirit of a public service is the primary purpose. Gaining a livelihood is
incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the entire purpose.
Id.
See also A.B.A. SEC. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON L. SCHS. AND THE PROF.: NARROWING THE GAP
(1992) [hereinafter NARROWING THE GAP]. TheMacCrate Commission Report, as
this document is called, deals extensively with the perceived need of law schools
and other legal institutions to help young lawyers develop the core skills necessary
for modem law practice, but it included an important section stating the
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respects, the effort has degenerated into a barely disguised attack on the
adversary system and the lesser lights of the profession. 4 At the same time,
as I argue in Part Hm of this Article, an anti-lawyer mood and a disdain for
practice has taken over much of the legal academy as well, so that law
schools do not provide as strong a voice as they might for the kind of
professionalism I advocate.
fundamental values of the professioft and urged their inculcation both before and
during practice. Many of the values championed by the MacCrate Commission
parallel those most often identified with professionalism. See id. at 135-221.
During roughly the same period, a movement for "civility" blended with the
drive towards professionalism. Prominent members of the bar decried what they
branded as 'Rambo lawyering," and claimed that lawyers who follow a "hardball"
or "scorched earth" policy in discovery and at trial are a detriment to society.
Advocates of more civility usually conceded that "uncivil" lawyers were
attempting to maximize client interests, using legally available tactics, but they
asserted that public values ought to trump the value of client service. See, e.g., John
C. Buchanan, The Demise ofLegal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and
Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1994).
The Stanley Commission Report, for example, posited that the lawyer's duty to
the system ofjustice "must transcend" the lawyer's duty to the client where the two
conflict ...... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, " supra, at 280. While there are
specific rules ofprofessional conduct that require the sacrifice of client interests in
exceptional situations-client perjury, for example, see MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3-that proposition cannot be true as a general
matter, or there could be no adversary system at all.
I Several academics have criticized the "professionalism" and "civility" move-
ments on exactly this ground. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary
on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995); Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 657 (1994); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A
Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1149 (1987); Jay Sterling Silver,
Professionalism and the Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 855 (1994).
It should be understood, of course, that neither these scholars norI disagree that
overly aggressive and uncivil tactics are morally troubling and that they can be
counterproductive. Nonetheless, these concerns do not put hired gun adversarial
ethics outside the bounds of law; rather, they heighten the moral dilemma of role
differentiation experienced by the most conscientious lawyers. See supra note 6.
Moreover, even if, as a matter of personal preference, I agreed completely that
hardball tactics were almost always inappropriate, I would not agree that they




"Zealousness within the bounds of the law" is still the watchword that
young lawyers ought to adopt as a mantra from their law school days and
hold constant throughout their legal careers. Or, as Robert Kutak, Chair of
the ABA Commission responsible for drafting the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, once wrote, neatly capturing much of legal ethics:
"[I]t may be a dog-eat-dog world, but one dog may eat another only
according to the rules."'35 Both of these formulations acknowledge that
contemporary law practice reflects a tension in our society between two
important values.
A competitive and individualistic spirit dominates the American
culture. Americans are not shy about demanding their "rights," no matter
that the other side may have rights as well, and no matter whether the
supposed transgressor is a private person or a public entity. It is therefore
hardly surprising that such a culture generated a legal system and a lawyer
corps that can give full play to this spirit. At the same time, the law
generally must impose some limits on individual aggressiveness, to
preserve public order and prevent chaos. The same need for setting limits
applies to the adversary system as well: zealousness, but within the bounds
of law. To substitute a different metaphor, even hardball is played
according to the rules.
When we do move towards the "limitations" end of the spectrum,
curtailing what lawyers may do to advance the goals of clients, any new
limits must be debated in the open and imposed only through established
legislative or judicial channels. Lawyers and aspiring lawyers cannot fairly
be criticized for practicing "minimalist" ethics if they obey every existing
rule.36 That is the rule of law. In his 1993 luncheon address, by contrast,
" Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOODLAWYER, supra note 27, at 172. Mr. Kutak, an Omaha lawyer, died suddenly
in 1983, shortly before adoption of the Model Rules and before publication of the
Luban book.
36 1 am neither claiming that the current rules of the adversarial game are
indifferent to non-client interests nor that they should be. Moreover, I not only
recognize that further inroads on wholly client-centered lawyering might be
justified, I have argued in favor of such amendments at numerous academic and
professional gatherings and in print. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 1.6:109-114 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996) (noting
that the confidentiality provisions of the official version of the Model Rules are far
too stringent and do not permit some disclosures that are "forced" by the operation
of other law).
The point of the text is that unless such amendments are adopted according to
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Judge Sporkin proposed a world in which even playing by the rules is not
good enough. He attempted to narrow the bounds of law by personal fiat,
without even suggesting how the rules of the existing adversary game
might be modified or making a reasoned argument as to why they should
be.
37
In the broader culture, of course, Judge Sporkin is on stronger ground.
That untutored culture sometimes assumes that the current rules of the
game are already much more restrictive than they are, so that aggressive
lawyering is by definition unethical or unprofessional. Other times, the
broader culture learns what the current rules are but finds them so lax that
it brands the rules as immoral. In that case, calling a lawyer who plays by
the rules an "ethical" lawyer is simply a cruel oxymoron.
Consider, for example, the well-accepted set of obscurantist tactics that
seemed to bother Judge Sporkin the most. At least in criminal cases,
defense counsel may, through cross-examination or through presentation
of truthful but misleading evidence, attempt to convince the trier-of-fact
that the facts are not what the lawyer actually knows them to be.38 So long
established procedures, they are not part of the "law" of lawyering. Lawyers are
bound to comply with the law as it is and should not be coerced into following the
law as I (or Judge Sporkin) might prefer it to be.
" Cf Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
After I critique the adversary system, you will wonder what I would
substitute for it. It should be obvious that as a postmodern, multicultural
thinker I have no one panacea, solution, or process to offer-instead I think
we should contemplate a variety of different ways to structure process in
our legal system to reflect our multiple goals and objectives.
Id. at 11-12. But ProfessorMenkel-Meadow, like Judge Sporkin, makes no serious
attempt to explain what a real-life lawyer faced with a real-life piece of litigation
should actually do-how far a real life lawyer may actually go-in order to serve the
client loyally but also ethically. Professor Menkel-Meadow's "postmodern"
critique of the adversary system is further discussed below. See infra notes 65-73
and accompanying text.
38 See 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function, Standard
4-7.6 (2d ed., Supp. 1986) ("[Defense counsel's] belief or knowledge that the
witness is telling the truth does notpreclude cross-examination."). This formulation
is significant because the comparable Standard for prosecutors is hedged
significantly. See id. The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.7.
Cross-examining the truthful witness was one of the three "hardest" ethical
conundrums posed in Freedman, supra note 29. Although controversial in 1966,
when the article was written, Professor Freedman's affirmative answer to this
question is now mainstream, and thus the question itself is no longer "hard." The
best and most often quoted evidence of this is the famous passage from Justice
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as they do not rely on false or fabricated testimony, lawyers may "spin" in
closing argument whatever alternative theories of the case they choose.
This can include Judge Sporkin's bete noire: the notion that the evi-
dence-properlyunderstood-does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
my client "did it;" therefore, somebody else probably did.
In an editorial comment in The Responsive Community, a
communitarian magazine, social critic Amitai Etzioni, after noting that
lawyers are already forbidden from employing certain tactics, such as
suborning pejury, asked why the "public dismay" over the O.J. Simpson
case could not be "galvanized" in favor of further limitations:
For instance, how about prohibiting lawyers from pleading a client
not guilty when they know he is guilty; and similarly prohibiting lawyers
Byron White's opinion in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967):
But defense counsel has no... obligation to ascertain or present the truth.
Our system assigns him a different mission.... [W]e... insist that he
defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty.... If he can confuse a
witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure
or indecisive, that will be his normal course.... [M]ore often than not,
defense counselwill cross-examine aprosecutionwitness, and impeach him
if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth.
Id. at 256-68 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (footnotes
omitted).
See also Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978
DUKE L.J. 921, and Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True LookFalse and the
False Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135 (1988), both of whom argue that changes in
ethically acceptable tactics can only be brought about by changes in evidence and
procedural law.
As to "making the false look true," Professor Schwartz's article also contains
a discussion ofawell-knownMichigan ethic's opinion, see Mich. State Bar Comm.
on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-1 164, summarized in [Ethics
Opinions 1986-1990] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:4757 (1987).
The opinion (and Professor Schwartz) approve of a criminal defense lawyer's use
of a truthful alibi defense where the alibi was germane only because the victim of
the crime was mistaken about the time when the crime had occurred.
Justice White's famous comment and the Michigan opinion provided the back-
drop fora spirited exchange between alaw professor and a criminal defense attor-ney.
See Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987); John B.
Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor
Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 339 (1987); Harry I. SubinIs This Lie Necessary? FurtherReflections on the
Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1987).
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from challenging the other side's veracity when they know it is telling the
truth?...
Nobody questions the need to protect the rights of the defendant, but
these rights do not include allowing those who are guilty to walk because
they have as lawyers the best fiction writers money can buy.
39
The trouble with these and similar "magic bullets" prescribed in the
wake of the Simpson case to cure whatever seemedto be ailing the criminal
justice system4° is that they substitute for our constitutional system of trial
by jury an ad hoe and extraconstitutional system of trial by lawyer. Instead
of having to convince twelve jurors of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
41
the government can all but extinguish a citizen's liberty by creating actual
knowledge in the mind of a single lawyer.4' Moreover, singling out for the
chop the defense tactics of misdirection through cross-examination and
spinning alternative (fictional) stories in closing argument shows contempt
for the jurors and is therefore also elitist and anti-democratic.4 3 It also
" Amitai Etzioni, On Making Lawyers a Bit More Socially Responsible, 5
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 4, 6-7 (Fall 1995).
41 See Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice
Process, andMagic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REv 989,990-92 (1996) (arguing that
slap-dash lawmaking designed to make unjust acquittals like the one in the
Simpson case less likely in the future will probably lead to more unjust
convictions).
41 In a few states, conviction by less than a unanimous vote of a twelve-person
jury is sufficient. This has been held not to violate the Sixth Amendment. See
Apodacav. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,407-12 (1972). Thatparticularreform wouldnot
have made a difference in the Simpson case, of course, since there were no votes
to convict on that jury. This fact did not deter Simpson-era reformers from
proposing broaderuse of non-unanimous verdicts, however. At leastthe reasonable
doubt standard is still constitutionally secure. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
361-64 (1970) (holding the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal proceedings to be inviolate).
42 The client known by the lawyer to be factually guilty could still proceed to
trial pro se, but that would be in violation of a different part of the Sixth
Amendment. The defendant would receive ajury trial, but it would be without the
assistance of counsel.
43 Although most discussion of troubling adversarial tactics focuses on criminal
defense work, contempt for jurors-and the lawyers who supposedly manipulate
them-is one aspect of the discussion that carries over most clearly into the civil
field. Today, the chief whipping boy for the excesses of the civil justice system is
the case in which a woman recovered a large compensatory and punitive damages
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ascribes almost mystical powers of persuasion to one side's lawyers and
conveniently forgets that the other side can meet this fire with persuasive
fire of its own.
This argument about trial tactics is richly played out in two contempo-
rary lawyer-bashing films, Cape Fear, a Martin Scorsese remake of the
1962 classic, and The Devil's Advocate.45 Both turn on crucial and brutal
cross-examinations of the victim in sexual assault cases-except that in The
Devil's Advocate, a coup de theatre gives the lawyer a second chance to
cross-examine, which he refuses, and in Cape Fear, the cross-examination
never takes place. Indeed, there is no courtroom scene in Cape Fear at all.
The Devil's Advocate opens with a close-up of the victim finishing
her direct testimony against the Florida high school teacher who molested
her. After a brief scene in which defense counsel Kevin Lomax, played
by Keanu Reeves, debates with himself over how to proceed in light of
his knowledge that his client is guilty, the film proceeds immediately to
the cross-examination. Lomax is able to catch the young girl in a series
of lies and exaggerations, although she sticks well to her basic story. The
audience is not shown any redirect examination or the closing argu-
ment of either counsel, but surely few viewers were surprised to find
themselves next viewing the victory party after the inevitable acquit-
tal-inevitable, that is, in a lawyer-bashing film based on the concomitant
premise that jurors are mere puppets in the hands of smooth-talking
award from McDonald's Restaurant after she spilled a scalding cup of take-out
coffee in her lap while driving. See Liebeck v. McDonald's, No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309, at *1 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994). Social critics, television
pundits, and everyday people on the street delight in ridiculing the verdict. See,
e.g., Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle Over Reform Heats Up, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at F7.
Looking a little deeper, however, we find that if the claim was legally frivolous,
it would have been dismissed by the court as a matter of law and the lawyer who
filed it sanctioned. At least that is what should have happened-where are the
judges? But given that the claim survived to a jury trial and verdict, we must
wonder what the jurors saw in the case that others did not. If the accident was so
obviously the fault of the plaintiffherself, why were the lawyers from McDonald's
able to convince everyone of that fact except the people who sat on the jury? Were
the gullible jurors merely tricked into overlooking this point by irresponsible
appeals to populist hatred of corporate giants and to the plaintiffs victimhood?
That is possible, but it is also possible that McDonald's had a track record, unique
in the fast-food business, of ignoring prior incidents and dangerously overheating
its take-out coffee. See id.
44 CAPE FEAR (MCA/Universal 1991).
4
1 THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. 1997).
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lawyers, incapable of the complex thought that the defendant might be
guilty despite the unpolished and partially deceptive testimony of his
nervous young victim.'6
On the heels of this latest triumph, Kevin Lomax is recruited to the
New York law firm headed by John Milton, played by Al Pacino. Milton,
we soon learn, is the Devil-not just a metaphoric devil, but Satan himself,
assuming the convenient human form ofalawyer 7 Significantly, since this
was a post-OJ. era film that was out to trash every aspect of criminal
defense work, Lomax's first assignment is simply to pick a jury that will
guarantee acquittal of a guilty client the audience does not even meet.4
"The analogous situation in the O.3. Simpson case was the popular perception
that the jurors could not see what most others could: that Detective Mark Fuhrman
was a racist who probably lied under oath and that O.J. Simpson killed two people
with a knife. I have argued that the jurors did see and accept both of those facts but
chose to ignore the second one. See Hodes, supra note 1, at 1102. That is what I
called "jury nullification of the third kind," id. at 1079, and what Professor Alan
Dershowitz referred to as a different "genre" of jury nullification. DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 1, at 93-98; see also supra note 25.
Damian Williams's proffered defense of mistaken identity in the Reginald
Denny case, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text, was similar. As Judge
Sporkin pointed out, see Sporkin, supra note 3, although Williams's lawyer made
such an argument to the jury in the face of videotaped evidence, the jury was not
fooled. Since Williams was convicted of some crimes, the jury at a minimum
believed that he was present at the scene. See People v. Williams, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
521 (App. Ct. 1996). Most observers agree that the acquittal on the most serious
charges was yet another example of mixed-motive jury nullification-sympathy for
the rioters, fear of provoking yet another riot, and so on.
7 That the Devil has the name of John Milton, author of the allegorical poem
Paradise Lost, cannot possibly be a coincidence. But what does it mean? I leave
that to my colleagues in the English literature departments and the film schools. I
do have it on the good authority of my sixteen-year-old son, however, that in some
high school classes, an expurgated version of The Devil's Advocate is shown, and
the link to John Milton's poem discussed.
4 See CAPE FEAR, supra note 44. See also AlbertW. Alschuler, How to Win the
Trial of the Century: The Ethics ofLordBrougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense
Team, 29 McGEoRGE L. REV. 291 (1998). The reference in the title is to Henry,
Lord Brougham, an English barrister who, in 1820, defended Queen Caroline
against charges of adultery by threatening to expose the like offenses of King
George IV. His famous use of"greymail," id. at 291, in a speech to the House of
Lords has achieved iconic status as the height of adversarial-but still
legal-advocacy. See id. at 292; see also Hodes, supra note 1, at 1104-08; Gerald
F. Uelman, Lord Brougham 's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 119 (1996). Professor Uelman, it will be recalled, was part of the
Simpson defense team. See id. at 119.
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As the film progress, the link between merely being a criminal defense
lawyer and serving the Prince of Darkness is made increasingly explicit.
Kevin Lomax becomes involved in a case in which he must present
perjured testimony in order to keep alive his unbeaten streak of jury trial
victories, and his wife is driven insane. At the climactic end of the film,
Lomax is transported back to the Florida courthouse of the opening scenes,
and he is once again gathering his wits before the fateful cross-examination
begins. Perhaps it was all a dream, or perhaps it was a vision of what
happens to lawyers who are willing to play the Devil's game to the hilt.
Given a second chance, Lomax refuses to cross-examine the young victim
of his client's assault and withdraws from the case.49 Disbarment is
Professor Alschuler was critical of many of the lawyers on both sides of the
Simpson case but refrained from the kind of intemperate attack that was so
common in the months after the verdict. Recognizing that Lord Brougham's
exhortation to save the client "by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and
costs to other persons" still did not include unlawful action, Professor Alschuler
considered whether any of the defense team's tactics did stray outside the bounds
of the law. Alschuler, supra, at 291-92, 313 (quoting 2 THE TRIAL OF QuEEN
CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., Albion Press 1821)). His chief candidate was
its well-documented use of race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection,
which is unlawful under Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that
the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), forbidding prosecutors to
challenge jurors solely because of race, applies to defense counsel as well as to
prosecutors). See Alschuler, supra, at 311-13.
Still, the Supreme Court's Batson-McCollum jurisprudence is on shaky
theoretical ground given that the Court has also insisted, in a line of cases
beginning with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,535-36 (1975) (disallowing the
exclusion of women from jury venires on the basis of gender alone), that the jury
be drawn from a "representative cross section of the community." Id. at 522.
Moreover, the Batson-McCollum principle is virtually impossible to enforce and
very easy to evade. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). Thus, Professor
Alschuler did not chastise too harshly on this ground. See Alschuler, supra, at 313-
14.
Cf Abbe Smith, "Nice Work if You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1998) (footnote omitted). In this
article, Professor Smith confesses that, as a criminal defense lawyer, he has used
race-based jury selection tactics. See id. at 526, 528. He adds, "In my view, I have
no obligation as an attorney to fight cultural stereotypes unless they are being used
against my client, or to serve the interests of the broader community, unless this
somehow also serves my client." Id. at 529-30. There follows, of course, a footnote
reference to Lord Brougham. See id. at 530 n.23,
49 See THE DEVIL's ADVOCATE, supra note 45.
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threatened, but the film's point is made: Kevin Lomax has saved his soul
by refising to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law.
In Cape Fear, the protagonist criminal defense lawyer is Sam Bowden,
played by Nick Nolte. Fourteen years earlier, he represented a vicious
rapist named Max Cady, played in the 1991 film by Robert DeNiro.5 As
Cady learned during the intervening years in prison, and as the audience
soon learns from Bowden himself, the lawyer had "buried" an investigative
report that could have been used to cross-examine the rape victim.
Moreover, reading between the lines, there was probably enough in the
report to have made the original cross-examination in The Devil'sAdvocate
seem tame by comparison: Cady was guilty but the victim was promiscu-
ous, and such information was admissible in the jurisdiction. Perhaps the
jury, if presented with this information, might disbelieve the victim's story
altogether, or perhaps it might believe that she had consented to the sexual
encounter. Perhaps the prosecution, fearful of those scenarios, might have
offered a more attractive plea bargain.
Sam Bowden, however, knowing that his client was guilty, was
unwilling to use his skills as a lawyer to try to win an acquittal or a reduced
sentence. Lying to his client about the impossibility of mounting a defense
on the merits, Bowden unilaterally disarmed himself and assuredthat Cady
had to accept a plea bargain that cost him fourteen years in prison." The
film is about Cady's brutal campaign to take revenge upon Sam Bowden,
his wife, and his young daughter.52
It is doubtful that Judge Sporkin would approve of lying to a client, but
he surely would approve of this fictional lawyer's bottom line-refusing to
argue that a guilty client was in fact not guilty. It is difficult to reach that
50 See CAPE FEAR, supra note 44. In the earlier film, the two key roles had been
played by Gregory Peck and Robert Mitchum, respectively. See CAPE FEAR
(MCA/Universal 1961). As befits an homage film, both actors had small parts in
the 1991 remake.
51 Late in the film, Bowden argues to Cady with some plausibility that even if
the trial had been conducted with full vigor, Cady might have been convicted
anyway and received a much longer sentence. Not every jury falls for every
lawyer's sleights of hand. Even if that were so, however, it is a fundamental
principle of legal ethics that the client must make such crucial choices. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1998). By withholding
information about the report from his client, Bowden nullified Cady's right to
participate in his own defense. See id. Rule 1.4 (stating that a lawyer must
communicate with client so that client may make informed choices).52See CAPE FEAR, supra note 44.
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bottom line position, however, without committing the first transgression.
If lawyer Bowden had provided full information to client Cady, the defense
of consent would have been back in the game. To their credit, the Cape
Fear filmmakers did not quibble about this point but recognized that
Bowden's action was completely unethical." A colleague chastises him for
violation of the rule of zealous advocacy, and during the final confrontation
between Cady and Bowden, Cady demands at gunpoint that the lawyer
recite Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility from mem-
ory-and pistol-whips him when he leaves out the word "zealously!"'
In the film as a whole, Bowden is a sympathetic figure who never
receives just punishment for his shocking betrayal of a client, only the
horrific campaign of terror and violence inflicted by Max Cady. The
audience is thus encouraged to forget Bowden's culpability, because it is
utterly overbalanced by Cady's. Indeed, given the prevailing anti-lawyer
sentiment, it would not be hard for many in the audience to see in Max
Cady's evil a vindication of what Sam Bowden had done fourteen years
earlier-perhaps Bowden did the right thing by refusing to defend his client
andby lying to him. This is a sophisticated form of lawyer-bashing indeed:
the lawyer is the sympathetic character, but only because he acts against
the law's most fundamental creed.55
53 At the close of The Devil's Advocate, when Kevin Lomax refuses to cross-
examine the witness, at least he has the decency to withdraw from the case.
Presumably, a mistrial would be declared, and eventually some other lawyer would
enter the case and defend zealously.
' See CAPE FEAR, supra note 44. In Raymond M. Brown, A Plan to Preserve
an Endangered Species: The Zealous Criminal Defense Lawyer, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 21 (1996), the author, a noted criminal defense lawyer and an anchor on
Court TV, see id. at 21, reminds us that this "Socratic dialog" about legal ethics
was not in the original film or the novel from which both films were adapted, see
id. at 30 n.29. He also notes the ironic point that by 1991, a majority of states had
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in place of the old Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and that the latter no longer contains such muscular
language. See id. at 28-30. But see 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 36, § 1.2:102,
at 24 (noting that the Model Rules "contain no single rule posing" a duty of
zealousness "in such sharp terms," but zealous service to clients is nevertheless "the
single most fundamental principle of the law of lawyering"). See also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3, Rule 1.3 cmt.
55 There is an especially effective additional barb that Robert De Niro imports
into the film with subtle maliciousness. When Max Cady first went to prison, he
was illiterate, but during the years behind bars, he learned to read. He read widely
in both law and literature. At the end of those years, he was handling his own legal
affairs, and that is how he discovered Sam Bowden's perfidy. Several times during
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Of course, Judge Sporkin finds support not only in the popular culture,
in polling results about attitudes towards lawyers,56 and among social
critics.57 Other members of the elite bar are frequently willing to participate
in his kind of selective lawyer-bashing. The elite bar concedes that there
are indeed bad apples among us, leads the effort to cleanse the bar of this
unwanted element, and in the meantime tries to soothe the public with the
thought that even now the good apples vastly outnumber the bad. This
would be an uplifting and worthwhile message, if only defenders of the
profession had a better eye for apples!
Instead, supposed friends-influential friends-of the American
adversary system join the demagogues in identifying as the quintessential
bad apples the lawyers who play by the rules and secure the acquittal of
factually guilty clients (meaning 0.1. Simpson most of all). Thus, the elite
establishment bar attempts to purchase the respectability of the bar as a
whole by drumming out of the corps the foot soldiers who do the nasty
grunt work, exactly as they are supposed to according to the bar's own
statements of principle. A few more such timid "defenses" of the rule of
law and we are all undone.
Consider, for example, the standard catechism as recited by Bobby
Burchfield, partner at the prestigious Covington & Burling law firm. 8 Mr.
Burchfield bemoaned yet another set of poll results showing plunging
respect in the nation for lawyers, referred to the O.J. Simpson case and the
McDonald's scalding coffee case, 9 but then added that such cases
epitomized "lawyers promoting theories just to obtain money for clients in
civil cases or to get clients off from criminal liability."6 ° In Mr.
Burchfield's defeatist view, "that can't help but have an adverse affect [sic]
on public opinion."'"
But why should that be so? Suppose instead that elite lawyers like
Bobby Burchfield took to the press and airwaves to explain to the public
why the cases mentioned ought not to have an adverse effect on the esteem
with which lawyers are held? Suppose that these elite lawyers educated the
the film, Cady refers to himself as a lawyer and taunts Bowden with the thought
that the two men are in effect co-counsel on his case, or "colleagues," discussing
a case. CAPE FEAR, supra note 44.
6 See, e.g., Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997,
atA6.
17 See Sporkin, supra note 3.
" See Klein, supra note 56, at A6.
59 See supra note 43.
o Klein, supra note 56, at A6.61 1d.
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public about what it means and should mean to represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law? Is the public incapable of understanding that
good, ethical lawyers are supposed to "obtain money for clients in civil
cases," and to "get clients off?"'62
III. RETHINKING THE POINT OF LAW SCHOOL-
THE LEGAL ACADEMY PILES ON
The elite of the legal profession includes not only lawyers and judges
but legal academics as well. This branch of the legal profession is perhaps
even more conflicted than the others about the place of adversarial zeal in
contemporary law practice because law professors are responsible in the
first instance for passing down the profession's values to each generation
of new lawyers.
But what are the profession's values? As I have tried to demonstrate
throughout this Article, the question whether American lawyers are too
aggressive or not aggressive enough is contested, and different strata ofthe
bar often give different answers.63 No matter how the question is resolved,
the legal academy will be greatly affected. If the profession's values are
still to include traditional client-centered, hired-gun advocacy, young
lawyers will get their first instruction in aiming better and shooting
straighter from the classrooms, clinics, and trial advocacy programs of
today's law schools. But ifthe elite segment of the bar (including some law
professors) is correct, a major flaw of the American legal system is
precisely its atomistic and adversarial quality. In that event, it will still fall
to the law schools to breed this quality out of neophyte lawyers.
For this reason, the American Bar Association's various commissions
and committees on "professionalism" and "civility" efforts are well-
stocked with legal academics and well-seasoned with citations to their
writings. It is also fair to say that while the elite view has (not surprisingly)
prevailed in these elite fora, contrary views-which are also more likely to
be found in law schools than elsewhere-are usually given their due.'
62Id.
63 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
64See A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGALEDUCATION ANDADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACH-
ING ANDLEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORTOFTHEPROFESSIONALISM COMMIT-
TEE (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT].
Articles critical of the notion that professionalism is a sorely needed quality that
goes beyond playing within the legal and ethical rules, including some of those
noted supra note 34, are cited by the ABA Section's Professionalism Committee
throughout the publication.
I personally cannot complain of being ignored either. The Professionalism
1042 [VOL. 87
RETHINKING THE WAY LAW Is TAUGHT
A good example of the academy's distaste for adversarial combat has
been provided by Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, atireless, prolific, and
skillful proponent of alternative forms of dispute resolution.65 Professor
Menkel-Meadow was one of the featured speakers at a W. M. Keck
Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics at the William and
Mary School of Law in March 1996.1 While nominally suggesting only
that traditional bipolar litigation ought not to be woodenly applied to all
situations, Professor Menkel-Meadow actually launched what she called a
"postmodern and multicultural critique!"6 of the traditional adversary
system. She sought to "shift the burden of proof' to defenders of the
adversary system and to "rethink both the goals our legal system should
serve and the methods we use to achieve those goals." ' Of course, just as
Judge Sporkin suggested in the very title of his 1993 luncheon address,
69
if the goals and methods of the law are reshaped, the world into which our
law school graduates go will also change, and eventually the law schools
will have to rethink the way law is taught.
One of the goals of the overall system that Professor Menkel-Meadow
did not want to alter was finding the truth, and she criticized hired-gun
tactics on the ground that they often work to obscure the truth instead, a
criticism that was central to Judge Sporkin's 1993 talk."0 The best defenses
Committee solicited my views, and I responded with along letter in June 1995. The
publication noted and fairly characterized the tenor of this letter, much of which is
reflected in this Article. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT,
supra, at 4 n.16.
65See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37.
See supra note 8.67 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 33.
61 ld. at6.
69 See Sporkin, supra note 3.
1o See id. ProfessorMenkel-Meadow agrees with Judge Sporkin that the current
rules of adversarial ethics are insufficiently exacting with respect to specific tactics
as well as generally.
[I]f the excesses of adversarial behavior concern us we could... require all
lawyers, not just prosecutors to "do justice" in lieu of only serving their
clients' interests, prohibit the cross-examination of witnesses "known" to
the lawyer to be telling the truth and prohibit the presentation of any
evidence at all "known" to be false by the attorney, and impose serious
sanctions for violations of these rules.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 38-39 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Menkel-Meadows's reference to "any evidence at all" is presumably a
reference to the fact that the current rules prohibit presentation of any false
evidence, but remedial measures by the lawyer are required only if the evidence is
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of the adversary system, however, not only concede that it does not
promote truth-seeking in any absolute sense but also maintain that this is
often its strength because other values are often more important.
71
Furthermore, where others fear that the official rules of the profession
have inappropriately de-emphasizedthetrue professional's commitment to
client interests by removing the word "zealousness" from the enforceable
rules of conduct and replacing it with a mere glancing reference in the
accompanying official comment,72 Professor Menkel-Meadow worries
material. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (1998).
71See supra note 38 and accompanying text; cf Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique,
Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988). Moral
philosopher David Luban has been a persistent critic of what he often calls "the
adversary system excuse." DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY at xix (1988); see also id. at 50-66. Professor Luban makes almost a blanket
exception for criminal defense lawyers, however, and specifically with respect to
the truth-finding function.
The political argument for zealous criminal defense does not claim that the
adversary system is the best way of obtaining justice. It claims just the
opposite, that this process is the best way of impeding justice in the name
of more fundamental political ends, namely keeping the government's
hands off people.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
It is true that the subordination of truth to other values occurs less frequently
in civil litigation, especially as between private parties of roughly equal bargaining
power. But that is in large part because the difference between criminal and civil
litigation has already been accounted for in the actual existing rules of the game.
Thus, some tactics that would be appropriate in a criminal case would already be
beyond the bounds ofthe law in a civil case. In particular, lawyers defending a civil
case may not so easily use the tactic of spinning the record facts to cajole ajury to
reach a counter-factual result because in a civil case the opposition may call the
lawyer's client to testify about the facts. (I am indebted to my friend and colleague
Professor Nancy Moore of Boston University School of Law for this insight.)
The distinction between the civil and criminal brands of adversary ethics is well
illustrated by the O.J. Simpson case. As I have written elsewhere, see Hodes, supra
note 1, at 1077-78 n.5, his team of criminal defense lawyers knew he was factually
guilty but were able to prevail in the case without violating significant rules of the
game. I have long maintained, however, that his lawyers in the civil case acted
unethically because they also knew that he was culpable in fact, and thus they
knowingly presented false testimony when he took the stand. Ironically, even
breaking the rules did not propel them to victory in the case.
72 Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980)
("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law"),
with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with
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about the "loophole in the language of the comments-where zeal continues
to rear its dragon-like smoke. ' m3
In a sharp response to Professor Menkel-Meadow's talk, Professor
Monroe Freedman, one of the leading defenders of the adversary system,
noted the ironic point that when Menkel-Meadow was involved in three
separate disputes in her own life, she chose for herself the traditional
litigation route.74 This irony reflects a double standard that is all too
common when elite lawyers survey the adversarial scene. Favored clients
and favored causes deserve full-bore professional treatment, but others
must make do with lawyers taking a less adversarial and more public-
spirited view. This double standard is especially pronounced with respect
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
'3 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 40. In an earlier article, Professor
Menkel-Meadow made clear her view that the law schools were on the wrong side
of the debate about the necessity for more professionalism and more training in
professionalism, and that the problem lay in the values transmitted during the law
school years.
[T]he traditional classroom fosters adversariness, argumentativeness, and
zealotry, along with the view that lawyers are only the means through which
clients accomplish their ends-what is "right" is whatever works for this
particular client or this particular case. We extol loyalty to the client above
all and neglect the responsibility of the lawyer to counsel the client about
moral and other concerns. Our case-by-case method, which focuses on
identifying principles of doctrine rather than principles of behavior, also
encourages moral relativism. The values that we attend to in the classroom
are apt to be individualism and autonomy, which we present as the basis for
the adversary system, the Bill of Rights, and the standard of proof in
criminal cases. We fail to teach our students that lawyering involves
responsibility to and for others [than clients].
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics? 41
J. LEGALEDUC. 3,7 (1991) (footnotes omitted). As have many before and afterher,
Professor Menkel-Meadow has first inappropriately conflated and then confused
mandatory rules of legal ethics with hortatory "rules" of morality and good
deportment. See Sporkin, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74 See Monroe H. Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 63, 68 (1996). Professor Freedman began his article with an ironic
barb: "I have always admired the adversarial advocacy with which Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow attacks adversarial advocacy. Also, given her postmodem
skepticism that there can be any certainty in truth, I respect her certainty about her
own version of truth." Id. at 63.
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to high-profile criminal cases, such as the OJ. Simpson case and the
Rodney King and Reginald Denny beating cases.'
When it comes to reshaping the law school and the law school
curriculum itself to reflect a less adversarial approach, few can match the
efforts of Dean David Link, who has been the Dean at Notre Dame Law
School since 1975-currently the longest-serving dean in the nation. 6
According to Dean Link, Notre Dame long ago implemented a pervasive
program of ethics instruction, one that self-consciously includes more than
just extra time devoted to the rules of professional ethics."7 Moreover, the
Notre Dame program goes beyond the much-discussed and highly
promising curricular reform of incorporating legal ethics issues into many
substantive courses.' Students are further taught that lawyers can be
counselors and mediators in addition to advocates.79 Rather than"accepting
75 As described infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text, Professor Barbara
Babcock applied this double standard to the criminal defense bar while delivering
a talk to law students encouraging them to become involved in criminal defense
work. For reasons that she could not satisfactorily explain, 0. J. Simpson was not
entitled to the same vigorous defense that she herself had provided to a poor client
while a public defender in Washington, D.C.
76 See Faculty Profile ofDavid T. Link(visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.nd.
edu/-ndlaw/faculty/link.html>. Dean Link is stepping down from his deanship in
1999.
' See David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 485 (1989).
" See id. at 486. For more on this species of curricular reform, see DEBORAH
L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD
(1994), a rich law school textbook that is about one half traditional legal ethics
materials (including readings in moral philosophy) and one half legal ethics
problem sets suitable for use in substantive courses appearing in the first year and
throughout the curriculum. Professor Rhode, who recently completed a term as
President of the Association of American Law Schools, see ASSOCIATIONS
YELLOW BOOK, Summer 1998, at 387, has been advocating this understanding of
the "pervasive" approach for some time. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics
by the Pervasive Method, 42 3. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992).
79 See Link, supra note 77, at 486. This much is not surprising in a world in
which the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have largely replaced the Model
Code of Profession Responsibility, which was criticized at a symposium that was
the intellectual birthplace of the Model Rules on the ground that its vision was
limited to that of "downstate Illinois in the 1860s." GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, ETHICS
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 16 (1978). See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 2.1 (governing advice to clients), 2.2 (governing service as an
intermediary), 4.4 (addressing respect for the rights of third parties), 6.1
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adversarial ethics unquestioningly," students "discover the lawyer's
potential as a peacemaker and as a leader in all levels of society.""0
This all seems admirably open-minded and pedagogically sound, yet
I am left with a lurking unease about how a student would fare at Notre
Dame if the student questioned adversarial ethics, but then accepted them
as best suited to solving the problems of many clients in many contexts.'I
At Notre Dame, students are encouraged to establish their own personal
standards of professionalism and to face up to the difficult choices that a
life in the law can bring. "Violate a canon of professional responsibility and
you might lose your license to practice; violate your personal standards and
you will lose all of your reasons for going to law school and becoming a
lawyer.
82
Again, I admit to doubts about the full implications of what is being
said, along with some unease. Does the program allow for the possibility
that, for some people, going to law school andbecoming a lawyer really do
mean becoming a scorched earth tactician? Or is Dean Link's assumption
that true professionals will always have personal standards that are
"higher" than that?
In subsequent writings and talks, Dean Link has more clearly articu-
lated an anti-litigation position that is more akin to that of Professor
Menkel-Meadow and Judge Sporkin. In an op-ed in the Chicago Tribune
written in 1995 during the O.L Simpson trial, for example, he responded
to the public perception that lawyers lack ethics because they are hired
guns who sell their services to the highest bidder. Accepting this premise,
he wrote, "It is incumbent upon our nation's law schools to develop
lawyers who believe their primary responsibility is to bring about justice
and peace between litigants, rather than strive for monstrous-sized
verdicts."83
(recommending voluntary pro bonopublico service) (1998).
Link, supra note 77, at 486.
81See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them:
Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993).
Somewhat mischievously, I have always wanted to ask Professor Menkel-Meadow
how a problem-solving lawyer should respond if a client, in high dudgeon, states
that he or she is having a "problem" with a detestable character and wants to
"solve" the problem by suing the bastard!82Link, supra note 77, at 487.
83David T. Link, Law Schools Must Lead Legal Profession Back to Its Roots,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, § 1, at 27. Compare this to the remarks of lawyer Bobby
Burchfield, supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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In 1997, during the Father Theodore Hesburgh Lecture at the Holy
Cross Hospital in Fort Lauderdale, Dean Link was more blunt. "My
solution for restoring the reputation of the legal profession is to scrap
adversarial ethics. '84 As reported in The Florida Catholic, in his talk,
entitled Professional Ethics: The Revival of the Legal Profession, Dean
Link asserted that the adversary system leads lawyers to adopt a "least
common denominator" approach that favors winning over "truth and
compromise and the best result for all concerned."85 The only hope Dean
Link saw for the revival of the profession was that law schools would come
to "want to produce lawyers who hunger and thirst for justice and healing
and peace.
'86
84 Robert O'Steen, Dean: Legal System Has Hit Bottom, FLA. CATH., Dec. 11,
1997, at Al; cf Roger Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty
Lawyers, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367 (1996) (analyzing the reasons for the legal
profession's unpopularity and the role legal education plays in contributing to this
negative perception).
8 O'Steen, supra note 84, at Al.
16 Id. at A13; see also Roger I. Abrams, Law School as a Professional Com-
munity, in A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR,
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 53
(1996). The symposium was held in Oak Brook, Illinois, in October 1996, and was
sponsored in part by the Professionalism Committee of the American Bar
Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. This is the
same committee that produced an influential publication. See TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT, supra note 64. Both the publication and the
proceedings of the symposium are available in pamphlet form, as cited herein, from
the ABA.
Dean Abrams of the Rutgers University School of Law in Newark proposed an
even more fundamental transformation of the law school world. Like Professor
Menkel-Meadow, see supra note 73, Dean Abrams sees law schools as replicating
and modeling all that is bad in the adversary system, see Abrams, supra, at 56-57.
There is too much of a power imbalance between teachers and students and too
much competition as between students. See id. at 54-56. The curriculum is shot full
of supposedly value-free teaching about argumentation and winning--even moot
court programs are counter-productive because they reward only the best
adversarial stylists. His solution is to create a "professional community" within the
walls of the law school, teaching from the very outset that thefirst responsibility
of lawyers is to act "with dignity and honor," meaning without incivility and
discourtesy. Id. at 59.
More fundamentally, the changes in curriculum, atmosphere, and educational
philosophy that Dean Abrams proposes are designed to
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As a final example of an academic who worries that professional hired
guns are a little too professional for the good of society, consider the
surprising case of Professor Barbara Allen Babcock's Distinguished
Lecture at my own school, entitled Inventing the Public Defender.87 The
case is surprising because Professor Babcock spent the first eight years of
her illustrious career as a zealous and aggressive criminal defense lawyer,
first with the firm of Edward Bennett Williams and then as a public
defender."8 Her 1983 article, Defending the Guilty, 9 is a classic defense of
the role of criminal defense counsel, and I have assigned it often as a
reading in my professional responsibility classes.
The point of the 1997 lecture in Indianapolis was to exhort students to
take up the important work of criminal defense, whether as a public
defender, in private practice, or as an occasional pro bono publico
assignment. During her talk, she rehearsedwith gusto the central story from
her 1983 article, which also began as a presentation to an audience of law
students. 9° Lawyer Babcock defended a middle-aged poor black woman,
who was charged with her third heroin offense and was certainly guilty.
There was no defense except that doctors at a public hospital reported that
rip[ ] away at the value-neutral facade [sic] that has allowed lawyers to
proclaim objectivity in a world where there is a right and a wrong. Lawyers
are officers of the court and protectors of the processes of the law, not hired
guns. Lawyers must learn that what they do has moral consequences.
Id. at 61. With due respect (since I graduated from Rutgers myself), I must protest
that even hired guns-if they are any good-are fully aware that what they do has
moral consequences. Further, it is not as settled as Dean Abrams appears to think
it is that playing the role of hired gun has only negative moral consequences.
Indeed, I have put the contrary case myself.
[The 0.1. Simpson defense team did involve the country in "confusion," as
Lord Brougham warned is sometime the unhappy fate of an advocate.] But
if playing such a role, "zealously, within the bounds of law," does
contribute to society, at least in the long-run sense that it helps sustain an
imperfect but morally justifiable system of trial by jury, warts and all, jury
nullification and all, then perhaps we ought to conclude that what the
defense lawyers did.., was not only ethical, but may actually have been
moral after all!
Hodes, supra note 1, at 1107-08.
87 Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, Address for Indiana
University School of Law Distinguished Lecture Series (Sept. 29, 1997).






the client had a mental disease then actually listed in the Diagnostic and
StatisticalManuaL Geraldine-as ProfessorBabcock called her in the article
and in both talks-had an "inadequate personality. 91 Using her skills as an
advocate, Babcock was able to parlay this diagnosis, together with
information provided by Geraldine's family and friends, into ajury verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity! Inadequate to the last, Geraldine, who
had taken little interest in the seven-day trial, burst into tears of joy. "I'm
so happy for you," she said to the lawyer who had just walked another
guilty client. 2
None of this was surprising. I knew the story almost by heart. The sur-
prising part came in the question-and-answer session when the conversa-
tion turned inevitably to the O.J. Simpson case. Barbara Allen Babcock,
criminal defense lawyer and elite law professor, would not stand up for the
Dream Team! Exactly what the lawyers did that was unprofessional or
unethical, she could not say. Why the guilty Geraldine was entitled to a
more vigorous defense than the guilty O.1. Simpson, she could not say.
At last, Professor Babcock muttered something about the case being
unusual, the prosecutors too timid, and the judge too weak. Surely,
however, she did not mean to suggest that the lawyers would have
demonstrated their professionalism-as officers of the court-by protesting
that their guilty client was receiving a windfall that he did not deserve. But
what did she mean to suggest, as she was on a mission to bring young
lawyers a message about the social worth of zealous representation for each
unworthy client, within the bounds of the law?
IV. EPILOG:
RETHINKING THE WAY TRIAL ADVOCACY IS TAUGHT
If one of the purposes of the Association of American Law Schools is
to provide food for thought for teachers at member schools, Indiana
University School of Law should keep its dues current. I attended the 1993
AALS weekend conference in Washington, D.C., on professional responsi-
bility, and I am still digesting the luncheon address delivered there by
Judge Sporkin, Rethinking the Way Law is Taught: Is there an Inconsis-
tency in Attempting to Teach Ethics Where the Substantive Subjects
Presuppose an Adversarial System?93 As has been evident throughout,
this Article is itself a delayed reaction to his attack on the adversary sys-
91 Id. at 179.
921d. at 178-79.
' See Sporkin, supra note 3.
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tern and, by implication, the nation's law schools. According to Judge
Sporkin, it is a hopeless task to teach ethics while the adversary system is
still in place, for it is per se "unethical" to practice law in an adversarial
fashion.94 In my view, by contrast, the law schools should be preparing
young lawyers for combat within the adversary system by teaching them to
aim better and to shoot straighter. That is the true meaning of professional-
ism.
Flash forward to January of 1999, and I again find myself at an AALS
function-this time a panel discussion on trial advocacy at the annual
meeting held in New Orleans. 95 Like Judge Sporkin's talk, the panel
discussion, entitled Teaching Law Students to be Advocates: Filling the
Gap Between Teaching Substantive Law and Skills Training,96 was about
the relationship between the substantive content of law andhowto go about
teaching it. This time the message was more appetizing. Unlike Judge
Sporkin, the panelists in New Orleans all supported the adversary system
and sought to help teachers help students master its demands.
This was no surprise given the career histories of the panelists, all of
whom were or had been active litigators, and most of whom were law
professors who maintained a litigation practice from within the academy.97
I See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text.
95 See ASSOCIATION OFAMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THEPROFESSIONALRESPON-
SIBILITIES OF PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS (1999).
96 See id. at 37.
17 Several of the law professors active in the Litigation Section oftheAALS are
also leaders of the American Bar Association Litigation Section. The morning
following the panel discussion described in the text, the ABA Section hosted a
breakfast to promote contacts between the section and law professors and to enlist
the aid of law professors in the ABA Section's efforts to improve the judicial
system and teaching about the judicial system. See id. at 73.
I attended both the panel session and the breakfast meeting because-as I hope
this Article demonstrates-I am an academic lawyer who supports the adversary
system and does not routinely disparage the efforts of the practice wing of our
profession. For comparison, referto the views ofProfessor Carrie Menkel-Meadow
and Deans David Link and Roger Abrams, supra notes 65-86 and accompanying
text. Moreover, I too have been involved as a lawyer, a consultant, and an expert
witness in several litigated matters during the twenty-plus years that I have been
a full-time law teacher.
Candor requires me to disclose, however, that by the time of the meetings in
New Orleans, I had decided to leave the teaching branch of the legal profession and
to return to private practice on a full-time basis. By the time this Article is
published, I will be a solo practitioner with a national consulting and litigation
practice in the law of lawyering. It is not a coincidence that my swan song as an
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The lead speaker was Russ Herman, a New Orleans plaintiffs' lawyer
heavily involved in the national tobacco litigation and settlement and
former President of the American Trial Lawyers Association.98 The panel
also included Professor Christopher Darden of Southwestern University
School of Law-the same Christopher Darden who served as second-chair
prosecutor in the O.J. Simpson case-and Professor Eleanor Myers of
Temple University School of Law, an experienced litigator in national class
actions in the antitrust and securities area. The final speaker was Professor
Michael Tigar of the American University's Washington College of Law,
whose most recent court appearance in a high profile case had been as lead
defense counsel for Oklahoma City bombing defendant Terry Nichols."
Expressed in different ways and through the use of different examples,
the panelists had a common message for the audience-a message intended
to be reconveyed to law students: an advocate must be able to construct and
then make come alive in the courtroom a central narrative of the case-a
story or perhaps even a soundbite that will play to the in-court audience. At
the same time, the panelists did not shrink from acknowledging that the
story being "sold" need not actually be true, so long as it can be promoted
through ethical means.
That formulation, of course, merely restates the central argument that
animates this Article. What means are ethical (even if morally troubling),
and thus required of the professional advocate, once actually engaged in
litigation? Is it permissible to take advantage of the procedural and
evidentiary rules of the adversary system in an effort to obscure the truth
rather than to help search for it?"e Is it permissible to try to make the false
academic consists of this Article on the adversary system, plus an article on the
hardball and sometimes unlovely tactic of preparing or coaching witnesses to
testify, known colloquially as "horseshedding." That second article grew out of my
experiences as a consultant and expert witness in asbestos litigation in Texas, in
which the plaintiffs' lawyers had been accused of stepping over the line from
zealous representation into subornation of perjury. See William Hodes, The
Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the
Law, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
98 Mr. Herman also appears as a legal commentator on such programs as Good
Morning America, The Today Show, and Newsline on CNN.
99 See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 95, at 37.
" See supra note 38 and accompanying text Justice White's famous comment
about the "different mission" of criminal defense counsel, quoted in partsupra note
38, concludes as follows: "[A]s part of our modified adversary system and as part
of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or
require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for
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look true andtrue look false, so long as the evidence and testimony actually
presented is not itself known to be false or fabricated?101
The lawyers and law professors at the New Orleans panel presenta-
tion, whether on the podium or in the audience, appeared to have moved
beyond these self-doubts. Zealousness within the bounds of the law
was their watchword, and the bounds of the law seemed capacious
enough. 102 The focus in New Orleans was more on how to convince
students that the role of professional advocate is still an honorable one in
a world where lawyer-bashing is a major league sport. Once the will is
assured, of course, there is still the question of what are the best ways. The
participants in New Orleans, at least, seemed to think that the academy
might help fulfill its obligation to the profession to provide more explicit
training in the technical skills oflawyering °3 by teaching hired guns to aim
better.
Throughout the panel discussion and continuing into the question-and-
answer period, however, and even into the joint lawyer-law professor
breakfast the next morning, I was nagged with uneasy thoughts. Does Judge
Sporkin know about these people?"° ' Are they not emblematic of the
problem he sees with both the legal profession generally and the law
schools? Would Professor Menkel-Meadow disapprove?"°5 Are not these
professor-litigators creating more problems than they are solving?1 6 Has
Dean Link found a way to abolish the trial advocacy course at Notre
Dame?
107
Partial answers to at least some of these questions have been provided
in the speeches and writings of adversary system opponents discussed
earlier in this Article. Near the end of her lament about the "trouble" with
truth." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,258 (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
Consider also the comment of Alan Dershowitz, another law professor who
sometimes litigates: "[A] criminal trial is anything but a pure search for truth.
When defense attorneys represent guilty clients-as most do, most of the time-their
responsibility is to try, by all fair and ethical means, toprevent the truth about their
client's guilty from emerging." See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 166.
101 See Schwartz, supra note 38.
'o See supra notes 7-8.
103 See NARROWING THE GAP, supra note 33, at 138-221.
'0o See supra notes 3-31 and accompanying text
's See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text
106 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 81.
7 See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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the adversary system m our "postmodern, multicultural world,"1 8 for
example, Professor Came Menkel-Meadow reveals that she has given up
teaching a course m trial advocacy 109 Ths is a personal career choice (with
overtones of academic freedom) that certainly ought to be respected,
especially when made by an academic with such high standing and long
seniority But I worry, as does Professor Monroe Freedman m his response
to her article, 10 that she might be tempted to impose this choice on others.
Would she vote m the curriculum committee or a full faculty meeting to
abolish the course? Would she be willing to trench on the academic
freedom of others and try to ensure that only a de-fanged course be
taught-perhaps a course that would produce, m the manner of Dean David
Link, only lawyers who "thirst for justice and healing and peace"' rather
than winning cases for their clients?
The very last sentence of Professor Menkel-Meadow's attack on the
adversary system suggests that with multiple choices of forums and modes
available for dispute resolution, "[n]ot everyone will have to be a 'hired
gun' m an epistemological system that is crumbling as we speak.""2 But
will some of us and some of our students be allowed to be?
There is a enormous job of education to be done, both inside the law
schools and out. The law schools, m the skills courses and throughout the
curriculum, must teach students not only how to be lawyers but to have the
courage to be lawyers. The second is sometimes as hard as the first m a
world in which even lawyers often have contempt for what lawyers do. The
bar as a whole must educate the public not to hate lawyers for the necessary
job that we do, but it will make no progress in that regard unless it first
educates itself.
"o3 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 5.
109 See id. at 40 n.170.
"0 See Freedman, supra note 74, at 68.
... O'Steen, supra note 84, at A13.
..2Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 44.
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